



# Case Study # 2 Investing in Infrastructure

IFSWF Subcommittee II: Investment & Risk Management Presented by the New Zealand Superannuation Fund





## **Outline**

- Context for infrastructure investment
- Landscape of infrastructure investment
- A possible SWF method
  - Analysis of sources of return
  - Risk analysis
  - Empirical assessments
  - Accessing investments
- Special topics
  - Working with government
  - Bids and tenders
- Appendix
  - NZSF infrastructure holdings
  - WEF infrastructure blueprint





# The Context Why we invest in infrastructure

- Infrastructure increasingly recognised as a distinct asset class, with definitive and risk and return characteristics separable from other assets
  - Stable, inflation-linked cashflows
  - Cashflows defined by essential nature of service, limited competition, long-lived assets
  - low market exposure (equity beta)
  - moderate to high interest rate sensitivity (fixed interest beta)
- Natural sellers
  - Fiscally-constrained governments with attractive assets or ambitious growth agendas that require these assets
- Natural buyers
  - Long-horizon pension funds and SWFs
- Natural (often, but not always) monopolies
  - high barriers to entry
  - long-term contracts
  - regulated pricing, delivery standards, etc.
  - stable demand base that is relatively insensitive to price and income





# The landscape Infrastructure assets suited to SWFs and the long-term investor

Utilities	Transport	Social
Power	Roads	Health
Water	Airports	Law and order
Gas	Rail	Education
Communications	Ports	Community facilities
Transmission & Distribution	Logistics	

- The classification of an asset as 'infrastructure' is best determined by market structure, the nature of the business and resulting cashflows rather than the sector in which it operates.
  - For example, airport revenues should be substantially aeronautical (regulated or not); if they are non-aeronautical, analysis should take a real estate/commercial property lens.
  - Alternatively, for utilities, the majority of revenue and EBITDA should come from regulated or take-or-pay contracts, with minimal potential for competitive market deregulation in the future.





## Sources of return

## And implications for a long-term investment strategy

#### 1. Market inefficiencies

- a) Listed index alternatives poorly representative of desired infra characteristics, i.e. benchmark inefficiency → prefer active, concentrated, strategy
- b) Immature asset class; few specialist managers; small allocations (if any); variation in institutional owner capacity → prefer active, concentrated, strategy
- c) Opportunistic deals available → prefer strategic stakes; peer partnerships
- d) Insufficient differentiation of various sub-types of infrastructure → prefer highly experienced managers and a concentrated strategy
- e) Mismatched demand and supply motivations for infra assets → be the marginal purchaser of greenfield, higher-risk, and 'partnership' assets; deploy sovereign advantage
- f) Mispricing: low-risk assets with lower 'headline' returns not favoured → prefer core assets
- g) Infra offers a large matrix of risk characteristics, all often borne by the same party (i.e. government) → prefer public partnerships, strategic stakes, non-competitive processes

#### 2. Diversification

- a) Infrastructure assets provide inflation protection (from contracts, pricing power, or CPIlinked pricing) → prefer inflation-proof assets
- b) Infrastructure not in policy portfolio → prefer assets that are least equity-like





## Sources of risk

## And implications for SWF strategy

- Standard portfolio risks: duration and illiquidity, agency risks.
- Acquisition risks transition management, overstaffing and unionised labour
- **Demand or patronage risks** Toll roads and airports vulnerable to economic cycle through reduced patronage. A long term investor should be comfortable holding an established asset through a cycle; structural changes in patronage have altogether different effects.
- Regulatory and political risks Infrastructure assets usually regulated by governments.
   Pricing and competition changes also change underlying investment assumptions.
   Applicable in both EMs and DMs.
- Refinancing risk Stable cash flows make infra suited to supporting higher leverage. Overlevered assets extremely vulnerable to credit market gyrations → focus on unlevered returns.
- Illiquidity risk A relatively new asset class for the institutional investor; most investments
  held by primary purchaser; limited data on exits.
- Greenfield risks. Development, construction ,ramp-up, and forecasting risk.
- ESG risks (next slide)





## **Investing responsibly**

## Of special relevance for SWF investment in infrastructure

- Infrastructure is different from other assets (for ESG purposes) because:
  - Large asset footprint implying significant impact on local community
  - Provision of essential service → reputational loss from failure to provide
  - Extra scrutiny of owners and managers from public and regulators in a monopoly environment

#### Environmental risks

- Ecosystem impact from asset footprint (including noise, traffic)
- Climate change impact and resilience to severe weather
- Waste, pollution, recycling; impact of spills, accidents and equipment failure

#### Social risks

- Safety of labour and end-users; managing relationships with labour (and unions)
- Land management

#### Governance risks

- Bribery and corruption
- Management incentives for long-term returns; alignment of owners, managers, government
- Accountability, transparency and accounting compliance
- Regulatory overlay





## **Managing communications**

Associated with investing responsibility, and delivering essential service

- Private participation in infrastructure finance, construction and service delivery remains novel in many jurisdictions
- The concept of 'pay for use' may be received with suspicion, especially if service delivery does not match perceived value for money.
- For brownfield assets especially, it is difficult to imagine paying for use of infrastructure which has been previously free
- These issues make proper communications on the roles of all parties, the risks borne by each, change management, etc. essential.
- · Again, there is little substitute for transparency, proper governance, and regulatory clarity.





# **Analysing infrastructure**

- Empirical analysis difficult given few listed indices, poor benchmark representation, only one (and perhaps two) market cycles in available data, → estimates are likely to be imprecise
- High frequency data is less useful as we can only answer if high frequency returns are correlated with market factors. Infrastructure investments are long-term holdings.

### NZSF analysis

- We estimate unlevered infra asset betas to be around 0.35
- Weak evidence that market beta has increased over time
- See evidence for a size (-ve) and value (+ve) bias
- Inflation and duration not significant
  - would only expect this in very long time series data
  - stronger results when universe narrowed to core infrastructure
- Lower volatility observed in infrastructure c.f. global equities

9. Illustrative asset risk assessment					
Asset type	Relative risk	Unlevered asset β	Potential for operational improvements		
Equity market	High	0.7			
Social PPPs, PFI concessions	Low	0.2	Very limited		
Toll road	Low	0.2	Very limited		
Water plant	Low-Medium	0.3	Limited		
Airport - single till	Low-Medium	0.3	Limited		
Regulated assets	Low-Medium	0.3	Limited		
Power - with take or pay contract	Low-Medium	0.3	Limited		
Pipelines	Low-Medium	0.3	Limited		
Airport - dual till	Medium	0.5	Yes		
Rail	Medium	0.5	Yes		
Ports	Medium	0.5	Yes		
Communications networks	Medium-High	0.6	Yes		
Power - merchant plant	High	0.7	Yes		
Telecom provider	High	0.7	Yes		
Average	Medium	0.3 - 0.4	Modest		

Source: NZSF





## **Accessing infrastructure**

#### Passive listed equity exposure

- Few listed, liquid, infrastructure assets and uncompetitive management fees

#### Active listed infra funds

Expensive, unproven, idiosyncratic definitions and targeting of 'infrastructure'

#### Unlisted infra funds

- Mostly focussed on brownfield infrastructure in the major OECD economies; close-ended, ten-year PE-style governance and fee structures
- Fund horizon mismatch with asset horizon; focus on medium-term exit rather than longterm value; assets must be sold to earn performance fees; incentives to increase leverage to increase performance fees; poor governance
  - Open-ended funds do not solve the problem; governance issues can be worse
  - Cash-yield funds blunt incentive to transact at right time and to invest in maintenance

#### ETFs

Limited availability; can be expensive relative to equity ETFs

### Segregated accounts

- Better alignment, more intensive relationship management


### Direct investing

- Intensive staff capacity and capability required, but best alignment





# Working with government: funding decision cycle







# Working with government

- Traditional infrastructure finance through government's own balance sheet. New understanding that governments do not necessarily need to build, own, operate; all that's relevant is service provision.
- Outright purchase of strategic assets by foreign SWFs has proved problematic
  - Santiago principles are best counter-argument
  - Transparency and accountability
  - Strong governance and commercial decisions
  - Repeated games and mutual trust
- New funding models e.g. PPPs can have their own problems.
  - Inappropriate/unsustainable risk and cost sharing
  - Viability finance
- Governments increasingly taking non-financial considerations must be taken into account:
   economic and social and environmental costs and benefits inform the whole-of-life assessment
- These non-financial considerations can include: standing of investor/buyer, quality of product, health and safety practices, training and development opportunities





## Non-competitive processes for long-term investors

- Contested tenders work best in competitive markets. Characterised by homogeneity of goods/assets, and complete and symmetric information.
- Competitive process can result in investors shading down their expectations (lower confidence) and requiring a higher uncertainty (as opposed to risk) premium.
  - For example, if the infrastructure asset is homogenous and non-rival (e.g. mobile phone spectrum) then the uncertainty risk premium able to be achieved is narrow.
- One solution for governments therefore to offer more and better quality information.
- A non-competitive tender creates more opportunities for vendor and investor to reveal information to mutual benefit
- There is also more incentive for both participants to reveal information if there is a long-term strategic partnership. Repeated game scenario offers very different cumulative incentives relative to a one-off game.
  - Meaningful fee savings on due diligence
  - Stronger alignment of interests
  - Efficient processing of strategic and tactical opportunities
  - Broader diversification from considering a menu of current and future opportunities
  - Extensive interaction with senior decision makers training and development etc





# **NZSF** infrastructure portfolio

- NZ\$1.05bn (3.5% of the Fund) currently invested in infrastructure
- Largest individual exposures to Z Energy (\$410m, domestic petroleum retail) and ConnectEast (\$234m, Australian toll roads)
- Geographically, largest exposures in Australia and New Zealand.
- Other exposures:
  - Listed airports ~\$200m
  - Listed energy positions ~\$70m
  - Balance as Fund exposures
- Combination of access points used
  - Investment Management Agreements (segregated accounts) primary method
  - Traditional Fund (GP/LP relationships)
  - Some direct stakes
- Challenges going forward are:
  - Have we got too much (or too little)
  - Have we got the right mix of investments
  - How do we access as effectively as possible





# The Infrastructure Blueprint

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		Jurisdictions that exhibit following particularly attractive to SWFs
Strategic Vision		<ul> <li>A.1 Integrated infrastructure pipeline</li> <li>Long-term vision with matching and pre-defined pipeline of projects → better project prioritisation by vendor; higher quality bids from investors → long-term multi-project repeated games, founded on trust and mutual benefit, better alignment of interest</li> <li>Regular project stream encourages investors to build local expertise &amp; capacity; provides scale economies on diligence</li> <li>A.2 Clear and viable role for investors</li> <li>Identify projects that benefit from private sector finance and are politically feasible; separate sources of risk and ensure private sector is called on to shoulder the most relevant ones for cost efficiency and project sustainability</li> </ul>
S		<ul> <li>A.3 Communications strategy</li> <li>Comprehensive public disclosure of costs and benefits for each project to all parties: government, investors, and public</li> <li>Explicitly separate ownership from control</li> </ul>
Policy and	Regulation	
Value proposition		<ul> <li>Bias-free across investor base and stable over time</li> <li>C.1 Assess financial returns for investors</li> <li>Provide consistent and market-oriented risk-return forecasts and benchmarks</li> <li>C.2 Risk allocation</li> <li>Framework to divide and allocate all project risks between government and investors; allocation of financing and</li> </ul>
Value p		demand risk of particular importance  C.3 Market sounding  Gauge interest & collect feedback on past/future projects; investor preferences should be always acknowledged